Quick Answer: What This Section Does

§ 147.4 (Guideline B) addresses whether your foreign contacts, relationships, or financial interests create a risk of coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

It does not prohibit foreign connections.

👉 It evaluates whether those connections make you vulnerable.

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What This Means in Practice

Most people assume foreign influence is about:

• disloyalty

• wrongdoing

• intentional misconduct

It isn’t.

This guideline is about something more subtle:

👉 leverage

Adjudicators are not asking:

👉 “Did you do something wrong?”

They are asking:

👉 “Could someone use this against you?”

That is a very different question.

And it is why this is one of the most commonly raised—and misunderstood—security clearance issues.

To understand how this fits into the broader system, see the

→ Security Clearance Insiders Resource Hub

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How This Guideline Is Actually Used

Guideline B is not triggered by having foreign contacts.

It is triggered when those contacts create:

• obligation

• emotional dependence

• financial ties

• or exposure to pressure

This means:

• family members abroad

• romantic relationships

• close friendships

• business connections

can all be evaluated under this guideline.

The issue is not the relationship itself.

👉 It is how that relationship appears in your record as a potential point of influence.

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Full Text of § 147.4

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§ 147.4 Guideline B – Foreign influence

(a) The concern. A security risk may exist when an individual’s immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(1) An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;

(2) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists;

(3) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government;

(4) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;

(5) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service;

(6) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;

(7) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;

(8) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(1) A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States;

(2) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official United States Government business;

(3) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent;

(4) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country;

(5) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual’s security responsibilities.

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How This Section Fits Into the Clearance Process

Guideline B is one of the core adjudicative guidelines used to evaluate eligibility under:

→ Adjudicative Guidelines

It is applied after your background investigation has documented:

• your relationships

• your travel

• your financial ties

• your disclosures

and it is often formalized in a

→ Security Clearance Statement of Reasons

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Why This Matters for Your Case

This guideline reflects a broader principle in clearance decisions:

👉 risk is not about wrongdoing

👉 it is about vulnerability

Two people can have identical foreign contacts:

• one is approved

• one is denied

Because the difference is not the relationship.

👉 It is how the relationship is interpreted in the record.

Adjudicators are evaluating:

• how close the relationship is

• whether it creates pressure

• whether it is fully disclosed

• whether it is stable and understood

This is why even legitimate, innocent relationships can still raise concerns.

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Related Statutes and Guidance

Return to the full statute list:

→ Security Clearance Statutes and Regulations

See how this is applied in real cases:

→ Guideline B – Foreign Influence (Full Breakdown)

Learn how to mitigate foreign influence concerns:

→ How to Mitigate Foreign Influence in Security Clearance Cases

Explore the full system:

→ Security Clearance Insiders Resource Hub

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Speak With a Security Clearance Lawyer Before Foreign Contacts Become a Record Issue

The most important question is not:

👉 “Is this allowed?”

It is:

👉 “How will this relationship be interpreted in my record?”

We offer free, confidential consultations to help you:

• understand how foreign influence concerns are evaluated

• identify potential vulnerabilities

• take steps to reduce risk before it expands

→ schedule a free consultation

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The Record Controls the Case.